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THE COMMON LAW: AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RECEPTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
FORD W. HALL*
"The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to be that of America.
Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birth-
right; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable
to their situation." Story, J., in Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144, 7 L. Ed. 374
(1829).
The story of the extent to which the common law of England has
been received and applied in the United States, is one of the most interesting
and important chapters in American legal history. However, many courts
and writers have shown a tendency simply to say that our colonial forefathers
brought the common law of England with them, and there has often been
little or no inclination to look further into the question. Nevertheless, the
problem of the reception of the common law in America has at various
times occupied the attention of many of our most eminent jurists and
statesmen, and from the standpoint of the modern law student the matter
certainly deserves more consideration than to be passed off with the mere
remark that the common law was brought over to America by the colonists.
Furthermore, the generality of such a statement is not wholly accurate and
is apt to be misleading.
It will not be the purpose to pitch on a philosophical level the discussion
of the problems dealt with in this article. Rather, the aim is to describe
comprehensively, but as briefly as possible, the process used by law-making
authorities in determining the applicable common law which guides the
various American state courts. This objective can best be achieved by using
the historical approach and relating the significant developments which have
taken place from the earliest colonial times up until the present date.
THE AMERICAN COLONIAL CHARTERS
It is apparent that it was contemplated by the British authorities at the
beginning of the American colonial period that English law should in the
main be transplanted to the American colonies. Every colonial charter granted
by the Crown contained a provision authorizing the governing authorities of
each plantation to prescribe ordinances, laws, statutes, etc., but invariably the
qualification was added: ". . . soe as such Lawes and Ordinances be not
contrarie or repugnant to the Lawes and Status of this our Realme of
England,"1 or words of like import. However, at the same time it undoubtedly
*Member of Texas and Louisiana Bars.
1. Charter of Massachusetts Bay-1629, 3 TiaoRPE, AMERMCAN CHARTERS CON-
STUTIONS, AND ORGANIc LAws 1853 (1909).
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must have been recognized that some allowances would have to be made for
the different conditions existing in a new and undeveloped country. Thus,
most of the charters expressly provided that the colonial laws should not
be contrary to, but should be "agreeable (as weere as conveniently itay bee)
to the Lawes of England .. ."2 One can only conjecture as to why the
phrase "as near as conveniently may be," was omitted from a few early
colonial chartes and included in most of them. An analysis of the dates of
the various charters shows that this phrase was included in the charter to
Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584,' the Second Charter of Virginia in 1609, 4 the
Charter of New England in 1620, the Charter of Maryland in 1632,0 the
Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in 1663, 7 and the
Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania in 1681.8 However, after the
Restoration in England in 1660, the Crown and Parliament turned a more
and more watchful eye toward the American colonies; thus, not only did
the Charter of Massachusetts Bay in 1691 and the Charter of Georgia in
1732 omit this phrase which could be interpreted to give the colonies a
certain amount of leeway in carrying out their governmental functions, but
also the requirement was made that the laws of said colonies should be
transmitted to England for approbation or disallowance.
The foregoing charter provisions were concerned primarily with assur-
ing that statutory law in the colonies should be kept in line with English
tradition. It seems clear that it was intended that colonial law should not
be repugnant to English unwritten law as well as to acts of Parliament,
inasmuch as-several charters provided that colonial laws should not be re-
pugnant to English laws and statutes ;1o other charters said that colonial laws
should not be contrary to ". . . the Laws, Statutes, Government, and Policy
of this our Realm of England,"" while two charters incorporated in their
provisions the limitation that colonial ordinances, etc., should not be contrary
to English laws and customs.'2 Most of the charters were not explicit on
the question of whether or not colonial judicial proceedings should follow
2. Grant of the Province of Maine-1639, 3 id. at 1628 (italics added).
3. 1 id. at 55.
4. 7 id. at 3801.
5. 3 id. at 1833.
6. 3 id. at 1680.
7. 6 id. at 3215.
8. 5 id. at 3038.
9. Massachusetts Bay: 3 id. at 1857; Georgia: 2 id. at 772. A similar requirement
is found in the Pennsylvania Charter of 1681, 5 id. at 3039. The Massachusetts Bay
Charter of 1691 also provided that in civil and criminal cases appeals might be taken
to England to the King in Council. 3 id. at 1881. See generally: SAtITH, APPEALs TO
THE PRIVY COUNcIL. FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950).
10. Grant of the Province of Maine-1664, 3 THoRPz op. cit. stepra note 1, at 1639.
11. Second Charter of Virginia-1609, 7 id. at 3801; The Charter of New England
-1620, 3 id. at 1833.




the exceedingly technical common-law example in the procedural matters
of pleading, issuance of writs, conduct of trial, etc. One explanation for
this may be suggested by the commercial nature of several of the companies
to which charters were granted and the probability that the draftsmen of
the charters were primarily thinking of the companies as business corpora-
tions more than as governmental units. However, the Second Charter of
Virginia in 1609 did contain a reference to conformity to English adjective
law as it gave the Council full power to correct, punish, pardon, govern
and rule all the subjects "So always as the said Statutes, Ordinances and
Proceedings as near as conveniently may be, be agreeable to the Laws,
Statutes, Government, and Policy of this our Realm of England."'13
It is doubtful if these differences in phraseology among the several
charters are very significant. No doubt the English authorities contemplated
that eventually British laws, customs, policies and system of government
should prevail in all the colonies, but it must have been realized that a com-
plete transplanting of British usages could not be accomplished at once
because of basic social and economic differences existing between England
and the newly-settled wilderness. For example, the table at the beginning
of Coke's Fourth Institute lists 74 categories of English courts which are
dealt with in that volume. Even the fondest adherents to the common-law
system as it existed at that time could not have soundly advocated the im-
mediate setting up of such a hierarchy in America.
THE COMMON LAw IN COLONIAL TIMES
To what extent did the colonists in fact receive and apply the English
common law? Unfortunately we have available no complete answer to this
question; furthermore, it may well be doubted whether a generalized answer
should even be attempted in view of the numerous obstacles which are en-
encountered: the first settlements in the original thirteen colonies were made
during intervals which extended over a period of more than a century; the
various settlements were founded under diverse conditions, for dissimilar
purposes, and by people with widely varying backgrounds; geographical
conditions affected the rate of social and economic development of the several
plantations, and at the outset at least each colony tended to develop along
independent lines. These difficulties are further enlarged by the fact that
complete records of the jural activities of the various colonies are not
available, and historians who have investigated parts of colonial archives
which do exist have evidenced some disagreement on the extent of American
acceptance of English law during the pre-Revolutionary era. For example,
13. 7 id. at 3801. The same provision may be found in the Charter of New England
-1620; 3 id, at 1833. See also the Charter of Maryland-1632, 3 id. at 1680.
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it is the view of some writers that the English common law was for the
greater part not applied in America until well into the 18th century.14 On
the other hand, one legal scholar asserts that early American colonists
followed (although somewhat crudely) the English pattern to a large extent,
but says that the imitation was of local custom and local courts in England,
such as county courts and recorders' courts in London and various boroughs,
rather than the common law as administered by the King's courts at
Westminster.15 This latter stand is based on the premise that although
these English local courts were on their way out, they were at the beginning
of the 17th century still an important part of law administration in England,
and it was with these courts, rather than with the King's common-law
courts, that the colonists, most of whom were laymen, must have had their
greater previous experience. Naturally, it is argued, the colonists would
tend to imitate that with which they were most familiar.
In spite of the foregoing difficulties, it is believed that several generaliza-
tions can validly be made concerning law administration during the pre-
Revolutionary era; indeed, because of its effect upon subsequent American
legal development, the colonial experience cannot be ignored. It should of
course be kept in mind that developments in the several colonies occurred
by no means at the same time and some characteristics were manifest to
a lesser extent in some settlements than in others. Obviously, we cannot all
be legal historians and conduct intensive studies of what colonial records
are available from the original colonies. If the results of detailed investi-
gations into the past cannot be translated into a form which other students
of law can use, there would seem to be little point to making the investiga-
tions in the first place. The primary value of the present paper can lie only
in giving as complete a picture as possible of the development from the
beginning until now of this phase of American law.
Before any conclusions are drawn, certain basic facts must be sum-
marized. Few persons trained in the legal profession were to be found in
the various colonies during the 17th century;"6 furthermore, English law
14. See Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies in 1
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367 (1907); Hilkey, Legal Dc-
velopmtent in Colonial Massachusetts in 37 COLUMBIA STUDIES IN HISTORY, EcoNoMICs,
AND PuBLIc LAW 68 [224] (1910) (emphasizing the role of the Scriptures in law
administration) ; Morris, Massachusetts and the Common Law; The Declaration of
1646, 31 Aiu. HIsT. Rav. 443 (1926).
15. See Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New
England, 31 COL. L. REv. 416 (1931). Cf. Plucknett, Book Review, 3 Nzw ENCGLAND
Q. 157-58 (1930): "As early as 1648 . . . there had been a voluntary reception of a
good deal of common law, freely modified to meet local conditions."
16. The authorities are in accord on this proposition. See Goebel, supra note 15
at 419-20; MORRIS, STrUDIES IN THE: HISTORY OF AMERIcAN LAw 41 (1930); Intro-
ductory to WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 3-18 (1911); Reinsch, supra
note 14 at 369-70.
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books were scarce' 7 and these two circumstances continued to exist until
well into the 18th century. Therefore, practically all of the early colonial
tribunals which were set up to handle disputes were composed of lay judges
untrained in the law.' 8 At an early date there seems to have prevailed in
every settlement a popular demand for codification of the law. For example,
when the "Lauues and Libertyes" of 1647 were published to the inhabitants
of Massachusetts Bay, the General Court mentioned its desire to satisfy
the people's "longing expectation, and frequent complaints for want of
such a volume to be published in print; wherein (upon every occasion) you
might readily see the rule which you ought to walke by."' 9 This desire on
the part of the people for certainty in the law led to the early codification
in every colony except Maryland of the legal principles most essential to
the settlement of disputes in the social and economic system which existed
at the time.20  Thus, it was the local code to which colonial judges referred
as the primary source of law, and because of the scarcity of law reports
the common-law decisions of English courts could not have been to any great
extent the secondary source of law in the 17th century. These local codes
were in many instances manifestations of the demand for law reform which
many of the leading colonists insisted upon after having experienced dis-
satisfaction with the English system of administration of justice. Further-
more, back in England a movement for law reform was also taking place
during the 17th century which had reverberations on this side of the
Atlantic.
2 1
It is probably accurate to say that the southern and middle colonies
followed English precepts more closely than did the New England planta-
17. See WARREN op. cit. supra note 16, at 7; Kocourek, Sources of Law in the
United States of North America and Their Relation to Each Other, 18 A.B.A.J. 676,
677 (1932). For the view that the scarcity of law books may be overemphasized in
interpreting colonial law, see AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTEMa 43
(1940).
18. It was not until 1712 that the first professional lawyer (Lynde) became Chief
Justice of Massachusetts. See Reinsch, supra note 14, at 385. The first lawyer to serve
as Chief Justice in New Hampshire was Theodore Atkinson, who took office in 1754. Id.
at 383. On the other hand, William Penn was anxious to secure the services of trained
lawyers, and at an earlier date (1701) the first lawyer (Guest) became Chief Justice
of Pennsylvania. Id. at 399. See also WARREN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 8-10; BALDWIN,
THE AMaERscAN JUDICIARY 189 (1905).
19. Introduction to THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSErrS, 1647 (reprinted
by Harvard University Press, 1929).
20. Reinsch, supra note 14, at 410. In Maryland events took a somewhat different
turn, and there soon developed a controversy between the proprietors and the popular
element known as the "country party," with the latter clamoring for the application of
English law to Maryland, and the former resisting this demand as an encroachment
on the proprietary powers granted by the charter. ALEXANDER, BRITISH STATUTES IN
FORCE IN MARYLAND vi (1870).
21. See HowE, READINGS IN AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 78 et seq. (1949). For a
description during the commonwealth period of the movement for law reform in England.
see Robinson, Anticipations Under the Conlmoinwealth of Changes in the Law, in 1
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 467 (1907).
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tions.22  Part of the explanation for this may lie in the religious background
of the northern settlements. Although legal scholars disagree on the extent
to which Biblical precepts affected colonial law administration, there is no
doubt that particularly in New England religious ideas were significant
in affecting the actual working of the legal systems.23 For example, in
Massachusetts Bay the ministers took an active part in numerous early
judicial proceedings. 24  In fact, it is hard to draw the line between church
and state in Massachusetts Bay and in Plymouth during the earlier part
of the 17th century.
In view of the conditions which existed in America during the 17th
century and early part of the 18th century, it is readily apparent that the
English system of court organization and the substantive and adjective law
which it applied, could not have been duplicated in toto in the American
colonies, and no scholar argues that it was.25 The differences of opinion by
writers on colonial law administration are thus matters of degree and may
legitimately be resolved into questions of emphasis. Whether we emphasize
the imitation by the colonists of the practices of English local courts or
whether we say the early colonial judges were really applying their own
common-sense ideas of justice, the fact remains that there was an incomplete
acceptance in America of English legal principles, and this indigenous law
which developed in America remained as a significant source of law after
the Revolution. Of course in the earlier colonial period one of the chief
reasons for not applying many phases of the English common-law system
was the fact that the frontier economic and social system had not reached the
more complicated level which existed in England at the time. Yet, there are
a good many instances of conscious deviation from the English prototype.
22. See Reinsch, supra note 14, at 367, 371. The assemblies of the Carolinas were
the first of the colonies to pass acts declaring the common law of England to be in
force. See Reinsch, id. at 407-08; N. C. LAWVS 1715, c.31, §§6-7, found in I TENN. AND
N. C. LAWS 20, 22 (Scott, 1821).
23. See AUMANN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 53-61; 1 PowE.I,, REAL PROPRTY § 45
(1949). For a description of the enforcement in colonial Virginia of laws pertaining to
religion, see SCOTT, CRImiNAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, 239-92 (1930).
24. The Magistrates of the Massachussets Bay Colony were directed to hear cases
according to law; where there was no law, they were then to try the case as near
to the law of God as possible; and, if no certain rule should be found, the magistrate
was to use his best discretion. 1 MASS. COL. REc. 174-175 (Shurtleff ed. 1853). See
Aspinwall's preface to the 1655 edition of JOHN CorroN'S ABSmACT OF THE LAWES oF
NEW ENGLAND (1641) in 5 MASS. HIST. Socigry COLLECTIONS (Ser. 1) 187 (1816).
See also the last paragraph in the introduction to the LAWES AND LIrIzRI s OF
MASSACHUSMTS (Harvard Univ. Press 1929). The proceedings against John Wheel-
wright and the trial of Ann Hutchinson are two of the most noted examples of the
participation of ministers in the affairs of the colonial General Court. A SHORT STORY
OF THE RISE, REIGN AND RUINE OF THE ANTINOMIANS, FAMILISTS, AND LIBER-
TINES THAT INFECTED THE CHURCHES OF ENGLAND (London 1644); 2 HUTCHINSON,
HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 366 c sea. (3d ed. 1795).
25. But cf. ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW 358 (1927) : "As soon as the Colonies reached
a stage where there was need of any developed system of law, the whole of the English




But as the middle of the 18th century approached,' more and more English
principles and institutions were being applied and set up, as trained lawyers
became more abundant, and more English law books were available. After
the Restoration a more active exercise of the Crown's veto of colonial legis-
lation and judicial review by the privy council of colonial decisions, helped
bring about a greater conformity to the common law.2 6
The basic conclusion is that law administration in America, as it existed
around the middle of the 18th century, may aptly be classified as a develop-
ment of the English common-law system. True, it was not a complete
reception of British legal institutions, but fundamentally it was the com-
mon-law system which has secured a foothold strong enough to withstand
the popular hostility to England and anything English which was being
expressed and which reached its greatest outcry during the Revolutionary
War and the post-Revolutionary period. It should not be forgotten, however,
that the increasing influx of common-law principles by no means obliterated
the indigenous systems which had developed during the colonial era and
that there existed important differences in law in action on the two sides of
the Atlantic.
27
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
About the middle of the 18th century the common law of England
began to take on a new meaning in America. The same colonists who had
insisted that- certain English laws were inapplicable to their situation now
began to appeal to the common law for protection against Parliament and
the Crown. The various settlements were feeling a new kinship one for
another and it was acclaimed that all the American plantations, whether
considered to be provincial, proprietary or charter colonies, were entitled
to the common law of England.28  However, this clamor for the application
of English legal principles to the colonial situation was not based on a
love for the technicalities, niceties and fictions of the common-law system,
but rather on an appeal to the common law as an embodiment of natural law
principles of individual rights and personal liberty.29- In fact American
26. See generally SMITH, op. cit. supra note 9.
27. See 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, at 101-02. For comparisons of some
particular phases of American and English law administration during the colonial period,
see generally MORRIS, op. cit. sz pra note 16, and Scorr, op. cit. supra note 23.
28. One of the most critical legal problems of the times was the question of the
maintenance of the royal prerogative in the American colonies. Components of this
issue were the broad questions of what English general law was applicable and to
what extent acts of parliament governed the colonies. The problem involves too many
ramifications to be dealt with here. See SMITH, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 656. Judicial
highlights dealing with the problem of the extension of British law to the American
colonies are presented in GOEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 243-98 (7th Rev. 1949).
29. In 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTITuTION § 157 (2d ed. 1851), it is
maintained that the common law is "our birthright and inheritance;" nevertheless, in
1951]
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writers of the Revolutionary period often used the terms "common law"
and "Magna Carta" as synonymous terms. Undoubtedly it was this meaning
which was attributed to the common law when the Continental Congress
on Sept. 4, 1774, declared that "the respective colonies are entitled to the
common law of England." 30
Among the many problems engendered by the severance from the
mother country through the historic Declaration of Independence, was that
of what law should American judicial tribunals thereafter apply as the
rule of decision of specific cases. The substitution of the people for the
king as the source of sovereignty made it necessary to exercise some caution
in adopting the common law inasmuch as a good many of the old rules would
not fit into the political philosophy of the newborn states. After the Declara-
tion of Independence, three primary methods were used by the thirteen
American states in dealing with the problem of what English law should be
recognized thenceforth. These methods are outlined below.
At an early date following the Declaration of Independence a general
convention of representatives from various counties and municipalities in
Virginia adopted an ordinance which, among other things, was designed "to
enable the present magistrates and officers to continue with administration of
justice, and for settling the general mode of proceedings in criminal and
other cases till the same can be more amply provided for." 31 This ordinance
is an extremely important piece of legislation in American law inasmuch as
it contained the following provision which was later to be copied in statutory
enactments of many other states:
"And be it further ordained, that the common law of England, all statutes or acts
of parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of
king James the first, and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom,
together with the several acts of the general assembly of this colony now in force,
so far as the same may consist with the several ordinances, declarations and resolutions
of the general convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered in full
force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of the colony. m
the next section the common law is "limited and defined" as (inter alia) "the guardian of
our political and civil rights. . . . Compare: "I deride with you the ordinary doctrine,
that we brought with us from England the common law rights. . . The truth is we
brought with us the rights of men, of expatriated men." Letters to Judge Tyler, June
17, 1812, 4 WRITINGS OF THOIAS JEFFERSON 178 (Randolph ed. 1829); see Adams'
remarks on the subject in Novanglus, 4 WoRis OF JOHN ADAMS 122 (1851).
30. This declaration goes on to say: ". . . and more especially to the great and
inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the
course of that law." See 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 29, at 134 n.2.
31. 9 LAWS OF VIRGINIA 126 (Hening 1821).
32. 9 id. at 127. Georgia's reception statute is similar to Virginia's except Georgia
made no specific provision as to the force of British statutes. The Georgia revolu-
tionary legislature on Feb. 25, 1784 declared in full force the "common law of England
so far as it is not contrary to the constitution, laws and form of government .. " See
1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 54. Rhode Island's method was also similar. In
1766 Rhode Island provided that the laws of England should govern where no local
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Thus the Virginia courts were told to continue to look to English com-
mon-law decisions for guidance, and were also directed to consider English
statutes which had been passed prior to 1607, the date of the first permanent
settlement in America made under the auspices of England. The question
as to what English statutes were binding on the colonists during the colonial
period had been a vexing one and was necessarily akin to the broader political
problem of the extent of the power of the Crown and the British Parliament
over the American colonies. After the Declaratibn of Independence the
respective states were free to adopt what legislation each thought proper,
pending of course the successful outcome of the Revolution. The Virginia
solution of adopting English statutes of a general nature passed prior to
1607, necessarily omitted a substantial amount of later British legislation
which was well worth having. Evidently this was soon recognized in Vir-
ginia because a commission (which included Thomas Jefferson) was ap-
pointed to recommend the adoption by the Virginia legislature of specific
English statutes. During the legislative session of 1792, the Virginia
General Assembly enacted such of the British statutes as were considered
"worthy of adoption,"3 3 and thenceforth the effect of British statutes in
Virginia was more narrowly limited.
34
A majority of the original thirteen states used another method in de-
termining what law their judicial tribunals should apply, which is illustrated
by the following quotation from the New Jersey Constitution of 1776:
"... the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law,
as have been heretofore practiced in this colony, shall still remain in force,
until they shall be altered by a future law. .... 35
Similar approaches to the problem were made by Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina and Pennsyl-
vania.3 6 This kind of provision would seem to call for the courts to use
law specifically applied to the particular case. See 1 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 62.
The Rhode Island General Assembly also listed specific English statutes which were con-
sidered to be in force in that jurisdiction. Id. at 208-10. South Carolina was the earliest
colony to pass a reception statute. In 1712 South Carolina passed an act listing English
statutes in force and declaring the common law of England to be in force. After
South Carolina became a state, its constitution specifically continued all prior law.
This meant that the specific statutes listed in the act of 1712 and the common law of
England formed in the main the backbone of South Carolina's jurisprudence. Id. § 63.
33. 1 VA. Rzv. CODE, c. 40, p. 137 (1819).
34. Ibid.; see United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Carter, 161 Va. 381, 170 S.E. 764,
770 (1933).
35. N. J. CoNsT., Art. XXII (1776).
36. The reception enactments of these states are summarized in 1 PowELL, op. cit.
supra note 23, §§ 51, 53, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61. Vermont, which became the fourteenth
state of the Union, adopted in 1779 the "common law, as it is generally praticed and
understood in the New England States . . ." In 1782 Vermont made its enactment more
specific by retaining "so much of the common law of England, as is not repugnant to
the constitution, or to any act of the legislature of this State," and in addition such
English statutes passed before Oct. 1, 1760 as "are not repugnant to the constitution, or
some act of the legislature, and are applicable to the circumstances of the State...." Id.
§64.
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a different method of inquiry in determining the applicable general law
than would the Virginia statute. The New Jersey type of enactment would
seem to be more restrictive inasmuch as it directs the courts to the common
law as previously practiced in the jurisdiction, whereas the Virginia act
refers the judges generally to "the common law of England." As will be
seen later the differences in wording of the particular reception provisions
had little practical effect on subsequent case-law. 37 Neither type of reception
provision operated to hamstring the freedom of the courts in deciding cases.
In Virginia the courts had the last say-so as to what the common law of
England included, and in jurisdictions using the New Jersey method of
approach the courts were virtually unfettered in declaring what was the
common law of the particular jurisdiction because of the fact that there
was no agreement or knowledge in many instances as to what common-law
principles and English statutes had actually prevailed during colonial times38
In several jurisdictions unofficial lists or collections of British statutes deemed
in force, compiled by noted lawyers or judges, 39 helped to resolve the un-
certainty as to the effect of English acts of Parliament."
The third method of common-law reception was used only in Con-
necticut among the thirteen original colonies. No express statutory or
constitutional recognition of the whole of the common law is to be found
in this state during the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary period. Thus
it was left entirely to the courts to declare the force of the common law,
and this has been done in a somewhat selective manner as the Connecticut
Supreme Court has asserted that only that portion of the common law which
was applicable to the situation in Connecticut should be deemed to be the
law of that state.4' Here we see influences of the thinking of the colonial
period hanging over as New Englanders were claiming the benefit of personal
liberties deemed to be embodied by the common law, and at the same time
were denying that certain other English legal principles bound their courts.
37. See infra pp. 805-06.
38. "What English statutes are deemed to be in force here, is often a question of
difficulty, depending upon the nature of the subject, the difference between the character
of our institutions, and our general course of policy, and those of the parent country,
and upon fitness and usage." Shaw, C. J., in Going v. Emery, 33 Mass. 107, 115 (16
Pick.) (1854).
39. Maryland: KILTY, ENGLISH STATUTES (1811); ALEXANDER'S BrTISH STATUTES
(Coe ed. 1912). Pennsylvania: See the report of the judges of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court as to English statutes in force in that commonwealth, dated in 1808, in 3
Binney 599 (Pa. 1878). Georgia: SCHLEY, ENGLISH STATUTES IN FORCE. (1826). North
Carolina: MARTIN, COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN NORTH CAROLINA
(1792).
40. See infra p. 821.
41. See Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 167, 180 (1851). Sce also 1 PownLL, op. cit.
sutra note 23, § 52,
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THE WESTWARD TRANSMISSION OF THE COMMON LAW
After the Revolution, in order to settle conflicting claims by the various
original thirteen states to land west of the Alleghenies, it was finally agreed
that control of these western lands should be transferred to the United
States. In 1787 the Congress passed an "Ordinance for the government of
the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio" by which
a temporary government was set up headed by a governor and "three
judges, any two of whom to form a court, who shall have a common-law
jurisdiction .... "42 The governor and judges were directed to "adopt
and publish . . . such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may
be necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district. .... .43
"Judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law" were
guaranteed to the people of the territory.44 As soon as there should be
5,000 inhabitants, the Ordinance provided for the setting up of the second
stage of government in which a general assembly would represent the
people.
45
It should be noted that the governor and judges were given authority to
adopt existing statutes of the original states and not to author new legisla-
tion. Furthermore, the phrase "judicial proceedings according to the course
of the common law" could be susceptible to the interpretation that Congress
had thereby extended the common law to the Northwest Territory both in
substance and procedurally.4 6 However, the governor and the judges of
the territory apparently gave the phrase a restricted connotation because
in 1795 they felt it necessary to adopt a law declaring what general law
should be considered in force in the territory, and the resulting enactment
was a copy of the original reception statute passed by Virginia in 1776.47
The validity of the adoption by the Northwest governing authorities of the
Virginia reception statute of 1776 was questioned a good many years later
by Salmon P. Chase who was to become Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Chase's grounds of objection were two: (1) since at the
time the Virginia statute was adopted by the Northwest authorities, the
Virginia statute itself had been repealed, the law adopted was not a law of
Virginia and therefore it could not be adopted; (2) Congress, in granting
authority to the governor and judges of the territory, intended the adoption
of single acts, the subject matter of which when published would he clear
42. 2 THORPE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 958.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 960-61.
45. Id. at 959-60.
46. See infra, note 64. Salmon P. Chase was of the opinion that the quoted phrase
extended the common law to the territory. See 1 PEAsE, LAWS OF THE NORTWEST TER-
RITORY, 1788-1800 xvi (1925).
47. 1 PEAsE, op. cit. supra note 46, at 253.
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to the inhabitants of the Northwest Territory, and the act adopting the
common law in general was therefore in excess of the powers delegated by
Congress. 48  Certain other statutes adopted by the territorial judges were
subject to question inasmuch as they would pick only sections or parts of
statutes which they wanted and ignore the remainder, or they would rather
freely rephrase some statutes.' Furthermore, in some instances, the judges
would state no source for legislation promulgated which indicates that
there was no specific source. They also adopted acts from Kentucky, which
of course was not one of the original states.
49
Despite the infirmities connected with the legislation by the governor
and judges of the Northwest Territory, their adoption of the Virginia
reception statute set the pattern later to be followed by many western
states. For instance, the Indiana territorial legislature in 1807, with small
variances, adopted the Virginia reception statute as it had been originally
enacted in 1776,50 and essentially the same statute is in force in Indiana
today.51 Illinois followed with an almost verbatim copy of the original
Virginia statute, but later added the qualification that only the common
law "so far as the same is applicable" was adopted.5 2 The effect of this
qualification will be seen presently.
The Ohio legislature also copied the original Virginia reception statute
at an early date in its statehood,53 but repealed it a year later leaving no
specific statutory recognition of the force of the common law in that jtris-
diction.5 4 Despite some early sporadic protests it soon came to be accepted
that the act of repealing the Ohio reception statute did not eliminate the
common law.55 As a practical matter the courts needed some body of general
law to "supply the defects of a necessarily imperfect legislation,"50 and it
was natural that they should turn to the common law, which was the only
system of jurisprudence accessible to any extent. Michigan and Minnesota
did not have explicit statutes adopting the common law as the rule of
decision, unless it be considered that the Northwest Ordinance or the 1795
Act by the governor and judges of the Northwest Territory extended the
common law to those jurisdictions. In both states the courts soon declared
that the common law had been inherited and that no express adoption by
48. PHILRRICK, LAWS OF INDIANA TERRITORY, 1801-1809 ci-cii (1930).
49. 1 PEASE, op. cit. supra note 46, at xxiv-xxx; 1 BLUME, TRANSACTIONS Or TIlE
SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, 1805-1814, xi-xvii (1935).
50. PHILBRICIx, op. cit. supra note 48, at 323.
51. IND. STAT. ANN. § 1-101 (Burns 1946).
52. See 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra, note 23, § 71.
53. 1 OHIO AND N. W. Ty. STAT. 512 (Chase 1833).
54. Id. at 528.
55. See HoWE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 431-32 and authorities there cited.
56. Ohio v, Lafferty, 1 TAPPAN 113 (Ohio C.P. 1817).
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the territorial or state legislatures was essential to affirm the authority of
the common law.
5 7
When Wisconsin became a state its constitution provided that "such
parts of the common law as are now in force in the territory of Wisconsin,"
should remain in effect.5 s This method of recognizing the common law is
somewhat analogous to the New Jersey type of reception provision, which
purported to adopt such parts of the common law as were practiced during
colonial days in the particular jurisdiction. From the wording of the
Wisconsin reception provision, it might be logical to suppose that the
Wisconsin state courts should look to the practice of the territorial courts
in that jurisdiction to determine if particular common-law rules were actually
in force at the beginning of statehood. As a matter of fact the Wisconsin
decisions show that the judges have in practice generally looked elsewhere
to determine the applicable common law. 59
To the south, Kentucky borrowed Virginia law as of June 1, 1792.60
This meant that the original Virginia reception statute of 1776 was con-
sidered in force in Kentucky. Tennessee was governed by North Carolina
law immediately after its territory was ceded to the United States by North
Carolina; this meant that so much of the common law was to be recognized
in Tennessee as was not "destructive of, repugnant to, or inconsistent with
* . . freedom and independence .... -61 The common law was retained
by "continuation in force" clauses in the subsequent Kentucky and Tennes-
see constitutions.
2
Further to the south, Congress in 1798 established the Mississippi
Territory and provided that the Ordinance of 1787 for the Northwest
Territory should extend to the Territory of Mississippi with the exception
of the article forbidding slavery.63 The United States Supreme Court
several years later declared that this extended the common law to all the
territory, and thereby all other law, Spanish or French, was excluded.
0 4
"Continuation in force" clauses have kept the common law as the basis
of judicial decisions in the state of Mississippi and also in Alabama until
1907 when for the first time an express reception statute was passed by the
Alabama legislature.
6 5
57. 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, §§ 72, 74. For the background in Michigan
with respect to reception of the common law, see 1 BLUME, op. cit. supra note 49, at
xxxi, xi.
58. WIs. CONST. Art. XIV, § 13 (1848).
59. See the cases discussed in 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 73.
60. Ky. CoNsr. Art. VIII, § 6 (1792).
61. N.C. Laws 1778, c. 5, § 2.
62. See 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 75.
63. 1 STAT. 549 (1798).
64. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 227, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845).
65. See POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 76.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
As American civilization moved to the west coast, the common law
moved with it much in the same manner as it had spread to the Northwest,
Southwest and Mississippi territories.6  Most of the midwestern and
western states adopted general reception statutes patterned in the main after
the original Virginia statute, but often these reception provisions came after
it had already been tacitly assumed that the common law was in force. In
some instances laws of already established states or territories were ex-
tended to a new territory until the local government should have time to
set up laws of its own. 67  This meant that the common law as adopted by
the previous state or territory was deemed to be in force in the new territory.
In cases where the passage of a reception statute came later in the develop-
ment of a state or territory, it was deemd to be declaratory of existing law.6 8
Some qualification to the foregoing generalization needs to be made in
connection with the experience of Florida, Louisiana and the southwestern
states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. 0 In all of these
states the civil law was at one time in effect (although often somewhat
feebly), and Spanish and French influences are still felt today especially
with respect to land grants made prior to the gaining of control by the
United States. But generally the problem of the reception of the common
law in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California has been no
different from that of other states except the retention by some of the
named states of concepts derived from the civil law, as for example the
community property system in the southwestern states, has required the
courts of those states to use a somewhat different technique of interpretation
in order to fit the concepts into the general common law system. 0
Louisiana of course requires special treatment, and even there the
common law has had its influence. In 1805 the Territory of Orleans enacted
a crime's act which listed a good many common-law crimes and referred the
courts to the common law of England for their definition. 1 But the ter-
ritorial legislature provided for the adoption of a civil code which was
patterned after the French Code Napoleon. In spite of this and a Louisi-
ana constitutional injunction against the legislature of Louisiana ever
66. An excellent summary of the various reception provisions in the separate states
may be found in 1 POWELL, op. cit. sipra note 23, §§ 46-94.
67. See e.g., Arkansas: 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 80.
68. See the experience of Utah, summarized in 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, § 85.
69. Missouri and Arkansas probably should be added to this list inasmuch as the
territory comprising these states was a part of the Louisiana Territory prior to 1804.
See generally Houcic, THE SPANISH REGIME IN MissotRi (1909).
70. For a specific discussion of this problem in Texas see Hail, An Account of the
Adoption of the Common Law by Texas, 28 TE.. L. REv. 801, 809, 819 (1950). A
general discussion of the reception problem in Florida may be found in Day, Extent to
Which the English Common Law and Statutes Are in Effect, 3 U. OF FLA. L. RV.
303 (1950).
71. La. Acts 1805, c. 50, p. 416.
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adopting a general body of law by reference, 72 the assertion was made in
1937 by a legal scholar that Louisiana had become in fact a common-law
state.1 3  This somewhat bold statement was immediately contested by
several Louisiana law professors, 74 but it cannot be doubted that Louisiana
jurisprudence has been substantially affected by Anglo-American law in-
fluences, and the differences in interpretation on the force of the common
law in Louisiana resolve themselves into questions of degree.
MAJOR ISSUES, FACING THE COURTS ON THE RECEPTION PROBLEM
Having traced the principal methods used by the various states in
adopting the common law, we turn now to the principal problems which
the courts have had to deal with in determining the applicability of the
common law. In reading the American decisions handed down during the
several decades which followed the Revolutionary War, one cannot help
but be impressed by one striking characteristic. The thing that stands
out is the extreme amount of latitude which these courts enjoyed in deciding
cases. It is true that the courts of some states have generally hewed closer
to the line than others in following established common-law principles.1 5
Nevertheless, a review of the cases shows that no matter what the wording
of the reception statute or constitutional provision of the particular state,
the rule developed, which was sooner or later to be repeated in practically
every American jurisdiction, that only those principles of the common law
were received which were applicable to the local situation.
Most of the cases which refuse to apply English common-law precepts,
do it on the basis that such rules are inapplicable because of fundamental
differences between England and America in Governmental structure, basic
statutory policy, social conditions, economic status, or geographic and cli-
matic conditions.76  Several theories have been advanced in order to justify
the departures from admitted common-law rules. One manner in which it
has been done has been to advance the hypothesis that it was the common
72. LA. CONST. Art. IX, § 11 (1812). This provision has been continued and is in
the present Louisiana Constitution. LA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 18.
73. See Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TuLANE L. REv. 585, 596
(1937).
74. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert, McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the
Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TULANE L. REv. 12 (1937).
75. See the conclusions reached in 1 Pow E., op. cit. supra note 23, §§ 48-93 with
respect to attitudes adopted by the courts of the various states toward their reception
enactments.
76. Sometimes differences have been attributed to local "custom." See Seeley v.
Peters, 10 Ill. 104, 130 (1848); GOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 28, at 314. Some of the
earlier cases dealing with the extent of reception of English law are summarized in
Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the Anerican Colonies, 21 Am. L. REG.
(N.s.) 553 (1882). See also Pound, The Development of American Law and Its
Deviation from English Law, 67 L.Q. REv. 49 (1951).
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law we adopted and not English decisions.7 This theory that there is an
abstract common law as distinguished from the decisions themselves is
rather difficult for a realist to understand,"8 although it is analogous to
Blackstone's view that courts can only discover or declare the law and that
their decisions are merely evidence of what the law is rather than the law
itself.79 Another technique has been that of saying that it is a principle of
the common law itself that when the reason for the rule no longer exists,
the rule also ceases. Thus the judges using this reasoning abandon a com-
mon-law principle by purporting to follow the common law. The maxim
that when the reason for a rule ceases to exist, the rule also fails has been
dignified by a Latin counterpart: cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex.s°
Other courts have not felt it necessary to justify on theoretical bases de-
partures from earlier common-law principles, but simply state quite frankly
that only that part of the common law has been adopted which is in harmony
with the spirit and genius of our institutions.8'
Several things may account for the numerous instances of failure to
follow unwanted English decisions during the first several decades after
the Revolutionary War. During the latter part of the 18th century and
continuing until well into the 19th century, there was manifest a general
hostility to England and all that was English.8 2 Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and Kentucky legislated against the citation of English decisions in the
courts, and New Hampshire had a rule of court against it. s 3 A popular
statement of the time was: "they would govern us by the common law of
England. Common sense is a much safer guide."8 4
Another reason for failure to follow certain English decisions lies in
the fact that satisfactory collections of law reports were still not universally
available, and the courts in many instances were left with only Blackstone
77. See, e.g., Marks v. Morris, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & Munf.) 463 (1809). In Con-
necticut, Judge Root in the preface to volume 1 of Root's Reports declared that no
resort whatsoever should be had by Connecticut courts to any foreign system of law.
1 Root xiv (Conn. 1789-1793). For an example in Massachusetts of a departure from
a common law principle, see the noted case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (14
Metc.) 111 (1842).
78. "To talk therefore, about adopting the English common law without adopting
the decisions of the English courts is to talk about adopting something which does not
exist. . . ." Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARv. L.
Rav. 6, 14 (1910).
79. 1 BL. Comm1x. *70-71.
80. See infra p. 811.
81.The quotation from Story at the beginning of this article expresses the more
usual general approach to the reception problem.
82. See 1 Root, supra note 77 at xiv; Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the
Making of Anmerican Law, 48 Am. L. Ray. 676 (1914); WARREN, op. cit. supra note
16 at 224-25.
83. Pound, supra note 82 at 686; see Loyd, The Courts from the Revolution to the
Revision of the Civil Code, 56 U. oF PA. L. REv. 88, 111-12 (1908).
84. Pound, supra note 82 at 686.
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and his "complacent view' 8 5 of feudal real property law and overrefined
procedure. Civil-law forces were exerting an influence, and a movement for
codification of American law arose and was expounded with some vigor
for several decades."" At the same time the common law in England was
undergoing changes. In light of the foregoing considerations, American
judges were faced with the necessity of developing an American common
law. Dean Pound sums up the formative period of American law by saying
that the legislatures, courts and doctrinal writers had to test the English
common law at every point with respect to its applicability in America: thus
an American common law was developed in less than three-fourths of a
century, and Pound concludes that: "No other judicial and juristic achieve-
ment may be found to compare with this."1
8 7
In the midwestern and western states, differences in geographic and
climatic conditions, especially in regard to scarcity of water, have given rise
to more frequent deviations from recognized common-law tenets than on
the Atlantic seaboard. The fact that the population in these states was
scattered more widely was a significant factor in the rejection of the
English common-law rule requiring the owner of cattle to fence them in.88
Also, by the time that many of the western states experienced the formative
stages of their law, reports from eastern states and treatises written by
American writers were becoming increasingly available. In many instances
there had developed conflicts in authority on legal points. This meant that
the courts of the newer jurisdictions, which almost universally declared
that the common law of England could be found by looking to decisions
of courts of the United States, were afforded an even greater latitude in
choosing desirable legal formulae. This same technique was available to a
lesser extent to courts of the eastern states later on in deciding issues on
which there had arisen cleavages of authority in other jurisdictions.
SELECTIVE REVIEW OF THE CASES INVOLVING THE RECEPTION PROBLEM
The foregoing generalizations take on greater meaning in the light of
specific cases. Therefore, there follows a selective review of some of the
cases involving the reception problem with the two primary purposes of (1)
85. POUND, TEE FORMiATIVE ERA OF A ERICAN LAW 9-10 (1938); see WARREN,
op. cit. supra note 16 at 224-25.
86. Pound, supra note 82, at 691; SAMPSON, DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY OF THE
LAW (1823); WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMUERICAN LAW 58, 60, 648 (1837). For a
list of American references on the codification movement, see 2 HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF
LEGAL STUM 691-92 (2d ed. 1836) ; see also 1 SPRAGUE, SPEECHES, ARGUMIENTS AND
MISCELLANEOUS SPEECHES OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 219 et seq. (1884); Morrow,
Louisiana Blteprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for State and Nation,
17 TuILANE L. REV. 351, 394-405 (1943). -
87. PotmD, op. cit. supra note 85 at 21.
88. Seeley v. Peters, 100 Ill. 130 (1848) ; Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Iowa 396 (1857) ; see
PROSSER, TORTS 434 (1941).
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illustrating the instances in which the courts have or have not been willing
to depart from earlier common-law principles, and (2) showing that this
judicial process of selection of "applicable" legal rules is still going on in
this country. Except as otherwise indicated, all of the cases next discussed
have been decided in the past decade. The reception problem is by no means
confined purely to the interest of legal historians.
In a 1949 New Jersey case89 the respondent had refused to answer cer-
tain questions before a grand jury in claiming that she was entitled to a privi-
lege of refusing to answer on the ground, inter alia, that the answers might
tend to degrade her. The question on appeal was whether or not such a priv-
ilege existed according to the common law as adopted in New Jersey. It
will be recalled that New Jersey received the common law as practiced in
the colony of New Jersey. 0 The court found such a privilege recognized
in an English case in 1696, but noted that the privilege fell into disuse during
the 18th century, and an English treatise on evidence published in 1769
failed to mention the privilege. Yet, two decisions of the Court of King's
Bench in 1802 declared that a witness need not answer any question the
object of which was to degrade._No previous New Jersey decisions by a
court of last resort were found, and there were conflicting decisions in New
Jersey lower courts on the existence of the privilege. The New Jersey
Supreme Court asserted that it was not bound by any English case decided
since the Revolution, and in view of the status of New Jersey law, the
court found itself "free to adopt that rule which appears to be best suited
for the ascertainment of truth and the advancement of justice .. ."91 The
case went on to hold that no privilege against answers that tend to degrade
exists in New Jersey, basing the holding partly on the fact that if the New
Jersey legislature had intended such a privilege to exist it would have
listed it along with the instances in which that body had specifically rec-
ognized other types of privileged answers by witnesses. But the opinion
adds that even without the aid of the statute, the same result would have
been reached.
It will be noted that this New Jersey decision uses a technique which
has been usually applied by the courts in those states which adopted that
portion of the common law which had been practiced during colonial times
in the colony. That is, no attempt is made to discover if in fact the asserted
common-law rule was ever applied in colonial litigation.9 2 Rather, the
court looks to English decisions and treatises, and draws the inference,
89. In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
90. Supra p. 799.
91. In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 445, 67 A.2d 141, 147.
92. For earlier cases using this approach, see Commonwealth v. Churchill, 43
Mass. (2 Metc.) 118, 124 (1840); Williams v. Williams, 8 N.Y. 525, 541 (1853).
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which no one can rebut, that such privilege was not a part of the common
law received as part of New Jersey law. Another court, having before it
the facts of the New Jersey case, might have reached an opposite result by
saying that the 1802 English decisions recognizing the privilege were evidence
of what the common law must have been 26 years before when it was
adopted. 93 Yet, even though the opposite result were reached, a court
using this reasoning would still be ignoring the issue of whether such a
privilege had been recognized in the courts of New Jersey in colonial times.
Thus a state enactment which merely purported to keep in force that part
of the common law which had theretofore been practiced in the colony,
often has been employed to accept or reject an asserted common-law prin-
ciple in the absence of proof of historical fact. This practice has been
called a "travesty of history,"94 but it is a matter in which the judiciary
has had the final word because it is the courts which make the ultimate
decisions on the applicable law in specific cases.
A recent Maryland case illustrates that a court of a jurisdiction having
the New Jersey type of reception provision, will prefer not to decide the
issue of whether or not a particular common-law doctrine was in effect in the
colony before Independence, but instead will invoke alternative grounds
where possible. There the court avoided determining the applicability of the
English rule that an annuitant has the right to elect to take the principal
sum bequeathed for the purpose of purchasing an annuity, by saying that
the English rule, even if recognized in American law, would not govern
under the facts of the particular case.95
One should not be too critical of the courts for not following literally
a reception provision directing an inquiry into what the colonial law actually
was. In cases where proof of the actual practice in colonial times has
been brought to the attention of judges, they have made honest efforts to
determine the cases in the light of historical fact.96 But complete colonial
records have not been available, and with the heavy loads which most courts
have had to carry few judges have had time to conduct an independent
investigation into the colonial practice in every case raising the problem;
therefore, the approach has been that the applicable law may be found by
looking elsewhere-a method that leaves the courts relatively unfettered
in determining the major premise for a particular case. But the results of
93. Cf. Holcomb v. Hamilton, 1 Coleman & Caines 67 (N.Y. 1799), cited by
PoWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, at 180, as holding a 1794 English decision to be con-
clusive evidence of the common law applicable in New York.
94. See GoEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEvELOPMENT OF LEGAL IxsTrrU-
TiONs 330 (1931).
95. Gilbert v. Findlay College, 74 A.2d 36 (Md. App. 1950).
96. See opinion by Cardozo, C.J., in Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N.Y. 41, 175 N.E. 506
(1931); see also Matter of Murphy, 294 N.Y. 440, 63 N.E.2d 49 (1945).
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this approach have been satisfactory, for if judges had insisted on too close
adherence to colonial practices, the emphasis might have been too much on
keeping the law as it was, and judge-made law might not have evidenced the
capacity for growth which has enabled it to keep reasonably in step with
the march of time.
In 1941 the Georgia Supreme Court was confronted with a case in-
volving the reception problem. Because the first English settlement in
Georgia was not accomplished until 1733, the settlers had fewer oppor-
tunities to develop an indigenous law differing to any extent from the com-
mon law. The Revolutionary Legislature in 1784 declared the common law
of England to be in full force so far as not inconsistent with the Georgia
Constitution, laws and form of government.97 Thus, there is no specific
statutory authority and little early historical basis in Georgia for departing
from particular common-law rules on the grounds that these rules are in-
applicable to local conditions of society. Yet, in Hornsby v. Sntith,a the
Georgia court declared that "common-law rules unsuited to the conditions in
this State are not of force here and were not made so by the act of 1784.""0
The question in that case involved the right of a landowner to erect a
spite fence which was of no benefit to him, but which was intended to
injure an occupier of adjoining land. The court recognized that the English
view allowed the landowner to do as he pleased in this situation regardless
of motive; but despite an argument to the effect that the court would be
usurping the functions of the legislature if it refused to follow this common-
law rule, the bald assertion was made that "the common-law rule on this
subject is not the law of this State."100 This case exemplifies the usual
attitude that even though the reception statute contains no express qualifi-
cation receiving only "applicable" common law, the courts have felt free to
read an exception into it.
A recent Arkansas decision illustrates the general attitude taken by courts
when told to apply the "common law of England." Almost always the view
is either explicitly or tacitly expressed that in ascertaining the common law
of England resort may be had to cases from other American states as well
as to English decisions. In the Arkansas case' 0' the court was confronted
with the question of whether or not the state could recover certain personal
property under the common-law doctrine of bona vacantia or vacant goods.
The court quoted the Arkansas reception statute, which is a copy of the
Virginia act, and then declared that cases from other American jurisdic-
97. 19 COLONIAL RzcoRDs OF GEORGIA, 1774-1805 (Pt. 2) 290-92 (Candler ed. 1911).
98. 191 Ga. 491, 13 SE.2d 20 (1941).
99. Id. at 497, 13 S.E.2d at 23.
100. Ibid.
101. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, 206 S.W.2d 771 (1947).
I VoL,. 4
THE COMMON LAW
tions are persuasive as to what is the common law. 10 2  it was held that
the state had not brought its case within the meaning of the common-law
concept of bona vacantia, and reliance was placed principally on a case from
Illinois. As indicated above the approach by the Arkansas court is typical,
and it is defensible. When Virginia first declared the common law of
England to be the rule of decision, no doubt it was contemplated that
at first at least the courts would look primarily to English written opinions
in discovering the applicable law. But when one of the western states has
copied the Virginia statute, as Arkansas has done, there is afforded reason-
able basis for arguing that the legislature must have intended the adoption
of the common law as administered by courts with which they had been
familiar-i.e., the courts of sister states from which the early settlers of
the state emigrated. This interpretation of the "common law of England"
in reception statutes while sacrificing some measure of predictability gives
the law an adaptability to everchanging conditions which it might not other-
wise have if the courts were restricted to English decisions only.
Sometimes a court will reject an asserted common-law doctrine on the
grounds that the state policy as evinced in local legislative enactments is
inconsistent. For example, in the 1948 case of Mattfeld v. Nester,0 3 the
Minnesota court rejected an English rule mainly on the basis that it was
inconsistent with a legislative policy declared in analogous Minnesota acts.
The English cases denied recovery to a husband for the wife's funeral ex-
penses against a wrongdoer culpably responsible for the wife's death. The
English view was founded partly on a supposed public policy against setting
a money value on human life. The Minnesota court found this policy
changed and allowed the husband recovery, using the following language:
"Whatever public policy may have been, modern statutes allowing recovery
for the money value of human life in actions for wrongful death and in
workmen's compensation cases in effect declare as a matter of public policy
that there is no valid objection to appraising the money value of a human
life."'1 4 To buttress its position, the court declared that this is an instance
where the reason for the rule has ceased to exist, and therefore the rule
itself is no longer the law. Another technique might have been used: in-
asmuch as there was a conflict in authority among American decisions as
to whether a wrongdoer was liable to the husband for the expenses of his
wife's burial, the court could have declared that the common law prevailing
102. 206 S.W.2d at 774. See also Baker v. State, 215 Ark. 851, 223 S.W.2d 809
(1949). A note on the Baker case in 4 ARK. L. REv. 480 (1950) apparently makes the
erroneous assumption that the date 1607 in the Virginia-type reception statute was
intended to limit the application of English decisions as well as British statutes. See
infra p. 815.
103. 226 Minn. 106, 32 N.W.2d 291 (1948).
104. 32 N.W.2d at 309.
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in Minnesota is the common law as interpreted by courts of the United
States as well as those of England, and it could then have proceeded to
accept the "better" view.
A recent Wyoming case'0° illustrates the rejection of a common-law
rule having its basis in a feudal society differing from present-day condi-
tions. A bailor sued a bailee to recover damages for the loss of leased night
club fixtures which had been accidentally destroyed by fire. In the bailment
contract the bailee had promised to keep the property in repair and at the
end of the lease to yield the property to the bailor in good condition, ordi-
nary wear and tear excepted. Plaintiff argued that defendant was an insurer
under the foregoing covenants and relied on the common-law rule with
respect to leases of real property to the effect that a covenant to repair
leased premises obligated the tenant to rebuild buildings accidentally de-
stroyed by fire, even though there was no negligence on the tenant's part.
This rule of interpretation was found to go back in England at least to the
14th century. The Wyoming court referred to the difference in the status of
feudal society and present-day mores, but recognized that a majority of
American courts had generally adhered to the ancient rule of construction
on which plaintiff relied. The Wyoming reception statute is in the main a
copy of the Virginia statute with the qualification that the common law of
England is the rule of decision so far as the same is "not inapplicable,"100
and the Wyoming Supreme Court declared that "the common law rule of
construction of covenants to 'repair' and 'keep in repair' is not 'applicable
to the habits and condition of our society' or 'its circumstances.' "107 In
reaching this result, the court emphasized the modern role of insurance in a
commercial world, and further declared it better to apply a common-sense
construction--i.e., to follow the meaning of what people usually intend when
they use the term "repair."
Another recent holding that certain common-law rules are inapplicable
to local conditions involves the situation in Utah where the dry climate and
the necessity of irrigating and conserving water were held to be sufficient
reasons as to why "the common law of Utah does not read into the pre-
scriptive easement to carry water the same content as the English common
law has applied to rights of way over land."10 8 Similarly, a rule with
respect to the duty of owners of cattle to keep them off the highways,
recognized by a federal court in California to be a common-law principle,
was held to be inapplicable to present conditions in California inasmuch as
105. Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783 (1945).
106. Wyo. Corini. STAT. ANN. § 16-301 (1945).
107. Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 174, 163 P.2d 783, 798.




the common law was adopted when there was no elaborate system of highways
and when motor vehicles were non-existent.10 9 Another interesting case
from California rejects the common-law rule that when the wife commits
a misdemeanor in the presence of the husband a presumption arises that
she was acting under the coercion or command of her husband. 110 This
presumption was found to go back at least a thousand years; and most
of the American jurisdictions had applied it. Yet, the court pointed out
that the wife is no longer a marionette in law or in fact generally, and as-
serted that a "presumption that has lost its reason must be confined to a
museum; it has no place in the administration of justice.""'
Several recent cases deal with the question of the reception of principles
which have their origin in American or English jurisprudence since the
date of the Revolution. Thus, in a 1947 Nebraska case 1 2 involving the
interpretation of a will the court was confronted with the argument that
the doctrine of demonstrative legacies has no place in Nebraska law for the
reason that such doctrine was derived from the civil law and was not known
to the common law. Hence, the argument proceeded, the Nebraska Legis-
lature did not adopt the doctrine of demonstrative legacies when in 1855
it declared to be the law of Nebraska "So much of the common law of
England as is applicable. . .. ,,"3 New York cases were cited to the effect
that a demonstrative legacy was a new type of legacy created about the
middle of the 19th century. The court refuted this argument by saying that
law changes with the gradual changes of thought on the part of society,
and that the common law is applicable only insofar as it is suited to the
genius, spirit and objects of its intendments affecting the society of the
state. "There is no obligation on the part of this court to adhere strictly tc
the common law. . .," the court asserted,"x4 and it proceeded to invoke
the doctrine of demonstrative legacies. Nowhere does the court explain
how the doctrine it applies came to be a part of the common law of Ne-
braska, except that it may be said to be following the common-law pos-
tulate that it is the duty of the court to determine the true intention of the
testator, and that the doctrine of demonstrative legacies achieves this re-
sult. 1 5 The cases cited by the court have to do with the situation where
previous courts have refused to apply admittedly existing common-law rules,
109. Galeppi Bros. v. Bartlett, 120 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1941).
110. People v. Statley, 206 P.2d 76 (Cal. Super. 1949), 3 OKLA. L. REv. 442
(1950).
111. Id. at 81.
112. It re Lewis' Estate, 148 Neb. 592, 28 N.W.2d 427 (1947).
113. NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-101 (1943).
114. Ip re Lewis' Estate, 148 Neb. 592, 603, 28 N.W.2d 427, 433.
115. But the common-law rule of interpretation that the courts must search for the
intent of the writer had its origin around the beginning of the 19th century. See Curtis,
A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. Rsv. 407, 408-09 (1950). This
article contains a critical analysis of the oft-repeated "intention" rule,
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and not with the situation where it is desired to invoke a rule which was
not specifically recognized as a part of the common law at the critical time
of reception. Of course, where a common-law rule is rejected, the court
is necessarily creating a new rule in its stead; therefore the Nebraska
court's approach is not so paradoxical as it might first appear. Thus,
whether a court is rejecting an archaic rule as inapplicable or setting forth
a principle which has had only recent explicit recognization by the courts, it
is in both instances performing a function of allowing the law to grow in
order to meet new situations of society intelligently.
A similar problem confronted the Missouri federal court in Hawkinson
v'. Johnston,"0 where counsel for defendant argued that the Missouri re-
ception statute did not adopt the general doctrine of anticipatory breach
by repudiation of contracts because that doctrine did not explicitly become
a part of English law until 1853 when the familiar case of Hochster v.
De La Tour" 7 was decided. Counsel further argued that the Missouri
reception statute," s which is essentially a copy of the Virginia statute,
requires the courts to apply the common law as it existed in 1607. The
correct interpretation of the statute is that the 1607 date was intended to
limit the adoption of English statutes only and not to prevent the courts
from looking to English decision decided since 1607.110 At any rate, the
court declared that even if an English decision as of 1607 could be found
holding that there could be no doctrine of anticipatory repudiation of a
contract of lease, this would not bind the court. The decision referred to
the fact that previous Missouri cases had recognized the difficulty of ac-
curately defining the common law as of such an early date from the meager
precedents, and that Missouri courts had declared that "they were not
necessarily 'required to adhere to the decisions of the English common law
courts rendered prior to the Revolution, or subsequently.' "120 The court
then pictured the rule of anticipatory repudiation as having gradually crys-
tallized and as such had become part of the common law of Missouri.
In other cases courts have been faced with the argument that there is in
absence of precedent at common law, and they have answered with the
116. 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941).
117. 2 El. & Bl. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
118. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 645 (1946).
119. See, e.g., Baring v. Reeder, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 154, 161-62 (1806) ; Chil-
cott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 Pac. 391, 397-398 (1896). But see Ray v. Sweeney, 77 Ky.
1, 10 (1878).
120. 122 F.2d at 728. Other examples of the treatment of American courts of a
doctrine arising in England since the critical date of reception are the absolute lia-
bility cases. The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher has been rejected by a good many
American courts as an anachronistic principle inapplicable to conditions in America.
A recent federal case, however, decides that Oregon would follow the rule of absolute
liability in allowing recovery for damage caused by escape of stored water. Ure v.
United States, 93 F. Supp. 779 (D. Ore. 1950).
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proposition that the common law is not an arid and sterile thing and that
it is presumed to keep pace with ever-changing needs of society. Thus, it
has been recently held that an infant may bring an action in tort for a
prenatal injury caused by professional malpractice with resultant conse-
quences of detrimental character.121 Similarly, a few courts recently have
granted children a cause of action for the defendant's wrongfully enticing
a parent away from the family home.1 22 The Minnesota court in allowing
such recovery declared that "The reasons given for the supposed common-
law rule denying a right of recovery in cases of this kind have ceased to
exist, and, because that is true, the rule, if there ever was one, also has
ceased to exist."'123 Another recent example of a court allowifig a cause of
action in an instance where little or no precedent was available, is the case
of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,124 where it was held that a wife may bring an
action for loss of consortiun where the injury to the husband resulted from
defendant's negligence. The court allowed the action even though it was
"not unaware of the unanimity of authority elsewhere denying the wife
recovery under these circumstances. 1 2 5  Other courts, however, have felt
that recognition of a cause of action in situations where no case-law precedent
can be found, should come from the legislature rather than the courts.128
One should not become too engrossed in the instances of refusal by the
American courts to follow earlier common-law decisions, for it is essentially
the common-law system that the various American jurisdictions (Louisiana
excepted) have adopted. Citations in this paper are mostly to decisions
rejecting an asserted common-law principle, but many more cases might be
cited in which the courts of the various states have adhered to the common
law. For example, at an early date the Mississippi court in declaring the
rule in Shelley's case to be a part of the common law of that state, asserted
that it would be judicial legislation to hold to the contrary, and stated:
"Were it otherwise, the rules of law would be as fluctuating and unsettled
as the opinions of the different judges administering them might happen to
differ in relation to the existence of sufficient and valid reasons for main-
taining and upholding them."'127 Yet, on other occasions the Mississippi
court has followed the general trend of American jurisprudence in asserting
its prerogative to decide for itself what the common law is and in affirming
121. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
122. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn.
400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949) ; Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ii. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
123. Miller v. Monsen, 288 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1949).
124. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 80 (1950).
125. Id. at 812.
126. Rudley v. Tobias, 190 P.2d 984, 987 (Cal. App. 1948) ; Garza v. Garza, 209
S.W.2d 1012, 1015-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
127. Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343, 363-64 (1852).
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the proposition ". . . that it will not adopt such parts of the common law of
England as are contrary to conditions within this state. .... ,,12s
Examples may be given of several recent American cases in which the
courts adhere to earlier common-law rules even though the judge writing
the opinion expresses a personal preference for another rule. Thus, a recent
Maryland case denied the corespondent the right to intervene in a divorce
action based on grounds of adultery.'2 9 The court recognized that the
corespondent's reputation was often directly affected by the outcome in such
an action, but considered itself powerless to allow the intervention in the
absence of statutory authorization. Similarly, the Minnesota court held that
the words "child" or "children" as used in a statute did not include an il-
legitimate child, as the statute was interpreted in light of the common law
which considered an illegitimate child fihius nulius.130 The court considered
the common-law principle harsh as it barbarically handicapped and burdened
innocent children for the sins of illegitimate parents, but declared that
relief from this particular common-law rule must come from the legislature.
ARE BRITISH STATUTES PART OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW?
Briefly, some special attention should be devoted to the problem of
determining the extent of recognition which should be given to English
statutes. The various American jurisdictions may be divided into two main
groups so far as their treatment of English statutory law is concerned.
First, twenty states have enacted no specific provision dealing with the
question and thus have left it to the courts to determine what acts of
Parliament, if any at all, are to be recognized as part of the common law
received.13 1 Second, most of the remaining states have specifically directed
the courts to recognize as in force English statutes of a general nature
passed before a specified date, usually 1607 or 1776.132
As might be expected, the jurisdictions which have left it to their courts
to determine the binding effect of English statutory law, have reached all
sorts of results. A few courts have declared that no English statutes were
received as part of the common law ;133 some take a middle view by saying
128. City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 14, 177'So. 755, 758 (1937).
129. Lickle v. Boone, 51 A.2d 162 (Md. App. 1947).
130. Jung v. St. Paul Fire Dept. Relief Ass'n, 233 Minn. 402, 27 N.W.2d 151 (1947).
131. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Micigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Washington. For statutory or con-
stitutional references, see 1 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 23, §§ 45-93.
132. See the breakdown of this second category, infra notes 147, 148, 149.
133. Mississippi; Boarman v. Catlett, 21 Miss. (13 Sm. & M.) 149 (1849) ; Martin v.
State, 190 Miss. 32, 199 So. 98 (1940) ; see note, 13 Miss. L.J. 624, 627, n.20 (1941).
Nebraska: see Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 58 Neb. 522, 530, 78 N.W. 1054.
1056 (1899) ; Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 653, 256 N.W. 501, 504 (1934).
Texas: see the authorities cited in Hall, supra note 70 at 820-21.
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that only those English statutes are recognized which have become so in-
corporated into the common law so as to become a part and parcel of the
system ;134 whereas most of the states in this first category have asserted that
the common law of the local jurisdiction is the English customary law as
modified by acts of Parliament of a general nature passed prior to the
American Revolution. This latter approach thus accepts some, but not
all, of English statutory law enacted prior to the Revolution and has left
judges relatively free to make a selective application of British legislation.
For example, the Oregon court declared in a 1950 case that English statutes
of mortmain, so far as they inhibited public corporations from taking real
property, were local in character, were intended to remedy a mischief in Eng-
land, and hence were not applicable to conditions in Oregon.135- Similarly,
the ancient statute of Gloucester, providing treble damages for waste of
leased premises, was held to be a harsh rule and not in harmony with
conditions in New Mexico. 36 '
A recent Nevada case 13T provides the most striking example of the
culling process used by American courts in determining applicable English
statutory law. In an action to recover on a gambling debt, plaintiff argued
that the law of England on gambling at the time of the Declaration of In-
dependence was peculiarly applicable only in England because of the dif-
ferences in structure of government betweeen British and the American
states. It was contended that the variance in governmental structure, to-
gether with the Nevada statutes authorizing the licensing of gambling, made
no part of the Statute of 9 Anne, c. 14 (1711), in force in Nevada. The
Statute of Anne had been passed in England to implement and enforce
antigambling policy. The Nevada court admitted that certain parts of the
Statute of Anne, such as those sections permitting unlicensed gambling by
the royal family "for ready money only," are at hopeless variance with the
structure of government in America. But the British act was construed to
be severable and in spite of the lenient policy of the Nevada Legislature
with respect to gambling, it was held that the first section of the Statute
of Anne, which provided that gambling debts may not be- collected in an
action at law, is a part of the common law in force in Nevada. Thus in
this case is seen the express acceptance of part and rejection of another
part of the same English statute.
Again it should be pointed out that the foregoing decisions rejecting a
part of English law represent somewhat exceptional instances, inasmuch
134. See Crawford v. Chapman, 17 Ohio 449, 453 (1948).
135. In re Moore's Estate, 223 P.2d 393, 396 (Ore..1950).
136. Blake v. Hoover Motor Co., 28 N.M. 371, 212 Pac. 738 (1923).
137. West Indies, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Nevada, 214 P.2d 144 (Nev. 1950).
See also the earlier case, Esden v. May, 36 Nev. 611, 135 Pac. 1185 (1913).
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as there are a good many more cases which accept acts of Parliament as
part of American law. Examples of English statutes which have been recog-
nized are the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,188 early English statutes dealing
with the authority of officials who act as conservators of the peace, 130 the
statute of uses, 140 statutes passed in the 17th century providing for for-
feiture in common-law courts of various illegally used articles, 41 acts of
Parliament limiting early common-law strict liability for the escape of
fire,142 an early (1381) statute on forcible entry making the use of force
in obtaining possession of land a criminal offense,14
3 and numerous others.144
In this connection it should also be noted that even though a court rejects
an English statute, the same result may be reached as if the statute were
considered-in force. A good example is the declaration by the Ohio court
that the Statute of Charitable Uses is not part of the common law of
Ohio; nevertheless, a charitable trust is enforced in Ohio because of the
inherent powers of chancery courts over trusts.145  In summary, it may be
said that in determining whether a particular English statute is applicable
to the conditions existing in America, the courts have used about the same
approach as they have adopted in determining if English common-law doc-
trines are suited to the situation on this side of the Atlantic. One qualifi-
cation should be inoted to the statement that English statutes of a general
nature passed prior to the American Revolution will be recognized. If an
act of Parliament was passed only a short while before the Revolution, so
as to make it unlikely that its force was ever actually felt in America, the
English statute probably will not be recognized.
146
The jurisdictions which fall into the second main category, that is
those whose reception enactments specifically recognize British statutes
of a general nature passed before a certain time, may be further classified as
follows: (1) those states still having the original Virginia reception statute
138. People v. Den Uyl, 320 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1948). Compare an earlier
Michigan case declaring that Michigan adopted "the English common law, unaffected
by statute." Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105, 108. 27 N.W. 882, 883 (1886).
139. In re Sanderson, 289 Mich. 165, 286 N.W. 198 (1939).
140. Horton v. Sledge, 29 Ala. 478, 496 (1856). Contra: Thompson v. Thompson,
17 Ohio St. 650. 655 (1867).
141. Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal.2d 835, 118 P.2d 1 (1941), aff'd sub norm.
Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 63 Sup. Ct. 499, 87 L. Ed. 1165 (1943). The
United States Supreme Court opinion is an interesting one on the meaning of "a
common law remedy" which "the common law is competent to give" as used in § 9 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. The quoted phrases are no longer in the judicial code,
however. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333, Reviser's Note (Supp. 1950). On the question of
interpretation of the common law in California, see also People v. One 1941 Chevrolet
Coupe, 222 P.2d 473 (Cal. App. 1950).
142. McNally v. Colwell, 91 Mich. 527, 532, 52 N.W. 70, 71 (1892).
143. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 103 (1944).
144. See generally 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, §§ 45-93; 12 C.J. Coonon Law
§ 22, n.30 (1917) ; 15 C.J.S., Common Law § 13, n.37 (1939).
145. Urmey's Ex'r v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 164 (1853).
146. See Spaulding v. The Chicago & N. Ry., 30 Wis. 110, 117 (1872).
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which recognizes English statutes of a general nature passed prior to
1607;147 (2) one state recognizing British acts of a general nature passed
before the time of the Revolution ;148 and (3) those states adopting a re-
ception provision similar to the New Jersey enactment, quoted earlier, 149
which recognizes so much of English statute law as had theretofore been
practiced in the particular jurisdiction. 1 0 An analysis of the cases shows
that states recognizing English 'statutes of a general nature passed prior
to 1607 (or 1776) have used about the same technique of accepting or
rejecting British statutes as have the courts of those states forming the
first main category discussed above. Of course where the legislature has
set an outside date limit for the recognition of British statutes, the courts
have generally respected it.""'
Those states using the New Jersey type of provision, recognizing those
English statutes which had theretofore been adopted in practice, have had a
little different history. The difficulty of knowing the full extent of ac-
ceptance of English law in actual colonial practice, as has already been
mentioned, 15 2 helped lead to the adoption of a somewhat a priori method by
the courts of these states in determining the applicable English law. This is
also true with respect to ascertaining applicable English statutes. A very
early Pennsylvania case set forth the proposition that all statutes made in
Great Britain before the settlement of that colony should have no force
in Pennsylvania unless convenient and adapted to circumstances of this
country, whereas all statutes passed after the settlement of Pennsylvania
should have no force unless the colonies were particularly named.1 3 Cardozo
said many years later that this was a "common formula, yet subject, we may
be sure, to be overridden or enlarged by usage.' u5 4 Thus the rule laid down
by the Pennsylvania court constitutes no very definite guide, and one must
look to the individual cases decided since the Revolution to see what tech-
147. The states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Missouri and Wyoming. See the statutory references in 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra
note 23, §§ 70, 71, 75, 80, 91, 92.
148. Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (1943).
149. Supra p. 799.
150. Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island
and South Carolina. See references in 1 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 23, §§ 53, 58, 59,
61, 62, 63. Although the wording of their reception provisions varies in small detail
from the New Jersey pattern, the following states should be considered in this group:
Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Vermont. See refer-
ences in id. §§ 51, 54, 57, 60, 64. Also Maine, Tennessee and the District of Columbia
should be included inasmuch as their law was derived from Massachusetts, North
Carolina and Maryland respectively. See id. §§ 55, 66, 75.
151. Commonwealth v. Kentucky jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 38 S.W.2d 987 (1931);
Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29 (1877) ; Holloway v. Porter, 46 Ind. 62 (1874) ; Cottrell v.
Gerson, 296 Ill. App. 412, 16 N.E.2d 529 (1938).
152. Supra p. 799.
153. Morris's Lessee v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 64, 67 (Pa. 1782).
154. Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N.Y. 41, 54, 175 N.E. 506, 511 (1931).
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niques the courts have used in determining what English statutory law to
recognize.
A good many early Massachusetts cases simply state categorically
that certain English statutes were or were not adopted as part of the com-
mon law of Massachusetts. 15 5 These statements may be justified to some
extent by the fact that the early state judges had had personal experience
with at least part of the practice in the later colonial period. A later
Massachusetts case rejects a provincial law specifically made applicable to
Boston on the basis that the statute provided for the taking of property
without due process. 156 Another decision refused to recognize an English
statute passed only a short time before the outbreak of the Revolution be-
cause of the probability that it was never actually applied on this side of
the Atlantic. 5 7 However, the Massachusetts court has followed the rule of a
statute passed after the Revolution when that statute was found to be merely
declaratory of existing law.' 58 Other decisions show that the primary in-
quiry of the courts of states using the New Jersey type of reception provi-
sion, is not usually into what was the actual colonial practice, but rather
whether the courts consider the particular English act suited to conditions
in America.'1 9 In this respect again the cases use about the same approach
as do the courts of the states which have no specific provision as to the
effect of English .statutes.
New York, whose original state constitution contained essentially a
New Jersey-type reception enactment,10 has subsequently severely limited the
effect of British acts of Parliament. This would have been accomplished to
a large extent by the tremendous amount of statutory law which the New
York Legislature has passed so as to preempt the field in many instances,
but New York's second constitution omitted the provision of its predecessor
recognizing such British statutes as had formed the law of colonial New
York,' 0 ' and a New York legislative act passed in 1828 attempted to wipe
the slate clean by declaring that none of the statutes of Great Britain should
155. Sevey v. Blacklin, 2 Mass. 541 (1807); Commonwealth v. Warren, 6 Mass.
72 (1809) ; Hastings v. Dickinson, 7- Mass. 153, 154 (1810) ; Stowers v. Barnard, 32
Mass. (15 Pick.) 221 (1834) ; Shearer v. Mooers, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 308 (1837).
156. Wilkins v. Jewett, 139 Mass. 29, 29 N.E. 214 (1885).
157. Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 396 (1856).
158. Bull v. Loveland, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 9 (1830).
159. E.g. Going v. Emery, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 107 (1834) ; Vanuxem and Clark v.
Hazlehursts, 4 N.J.L. 192 (1818) ; State v. Campbell, 1 T.U.P. Charl. 166 (Ga. 1803).
Of course a statute passed after the Revolution is held not to have been adopted. Bates
v. Hacking, 28 R.I. 523, 68 Atl. 622 (1908) (1 Vicr. c. 26, § 22, 1837). A recent
Georgia case dealing with the problem of the force of British statutes looks primarily
to earlier Georgia decisions to see if they have previously recognized the acts in
question. Davis v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 61 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. App. 1950).
160. N.Y. CoNsT., Art. XXXV (1777).
161. N.Y. CoNsT., Art. VII, § 13 (1821).
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be deemed to have had any force in that state since May 1, 1788.162 How-
ever, later New York cases indicate that British statutes may still be perti-
nent where there is involved an issue of land titles originally granted during
colonial times.163
Those states which have had unofficial lists of English statutes deemed
in force compiled by leading jurists, have generally followed those lists in
subsequent cases. Thus, in an 1897 case 64 the Pennsylvania court declared
that the omission from the list of statutes previously reported by the judges
as being in force in Pennsylvania, raises a presumption of great weight that
the particular statute omitted is not part of the law of Pennsylvania. The
court stated that in absence of anything to overcome the prima facie cor-
rectness of the judges' list, the presumption must prevail. Therefore, a
lawyer trying to get a court to recognize an English statute not on the com-
piled list, faces the task of doing a lot of original research into colonial
archives, which may or may not be fruitful; otherwise; he is bound by the
unofficially recognized compilation. 65
A word should be added about the experience of Wisconsin and Iowa
with respect to recognition of English statutes. The territorial legislature of
both Wisconsin and Iowa declared that "none of the statutes of Great
Britain" shall be considered the law of the respective territories. 166 , Never-
theless, this territorial act has since become ineffective in Wisconsin inasmuch
as a good many later decisions explicitly recognize as in -force various
British statutes.' 67  Therefore, for practical purposes Wisconsin should be
placed in the first category as being a state that has left to its courts the task
of determining the applicability of English statutes. The Iowa court has
adopted a unique approach in interpreting its territorial act. In an 1857
case'6 8 the Iowa court distinguished "Great Britain" from "England" and
declared that Great Britain did not come into existence until 1707 when
162. N.Y. STAT. AT L., p. 72 (1862).
163. Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N.Y. 41, 175 N.E. 506 (1931); Bogardus v. Trinity
Church, 4 Paige 178 (1833), aff'd, 15 Wend. 111 (N.Y. 1835). The federal case of
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Weintraub, 196 Fed. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), rejected a 1773 act of
Parliament citing as one reason the- fact that subsequent New York constitutions, after
the first one, omitted the provision about English statutes.
164. Gardner v. Keihl, 182 Pa. St. 194, 37 Atl. 829 (1897). See also the recent
case of Miller v. Michael Morris, Inc., 36 Pa. 113, 63 A.2d 44 (1949), recognizing a
statute which was on the 1808 judges' list in 3 Binney 618 (Pa. 1878).
165. Note further the unsuccessful attempts to have courts recognize British
statutes not on compilations of English acts deemed in force: Hudson v. Flood, 28 Del.
450, 94 Atl. 760 (1915) ; Read v. Pennsylvania R.R., 44 N.J.L. 280 (1882) ; Dashiell v.
Attorney-General, 5 Har. & J. 392 (Md. 1822).
166. See references in 1 POwELL, op. cit. supra note 23, §§ 73, 90.
167. Cobura v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147 (1864) ; Spaulding v. The Chicago & N. Ry., 30
Wis. 110 (1872).
168. O'Ferrall v. Simplot, 4 Iowa 381 (1857). Cf. Pierson v. Lane, 60 Iowa 60, 64,
14 N.W. 90, 92 (1882), rejecting the Statute De Donis on the grounds that its purposes
were foreign to the genius and policy of Iowa institutions.
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Scotland was united with England; thus, the territorial act was construed
to eliminate only acts of Parliament enacted since 1707. Thus Iowa in ac-
tuality falls into the second main category except that its terminal date,
after which no English statutes will be recognized, is 1707, instead of 1607
or 1776.
In summary, it is noted from the foregoing discussion that the treatment
of the problem of determining the effect of English statutes in America has
not been basically different from ascertaining the applicability of English
case law. As state legislatures enact more and more local statutory law, the
need for recognizing British statutes would appear to be lessened; neverthe-
less, the fact that a number of recent cases are cited in the several preceding
paragraphs demonstrates that the issue of the force of British statutes in
America is by no means a dead one.
CONCLUSION
We have dealt with the three primary methods by which the common
law of England has been received and applied in this country. The Virginia
statute which declared the common law of England to be the rule of decision
and which dealt specifically with the force of English statutes, set the pat-
tern for a majority of states to the west, although it was varied by many
of them with respect to what English statutes were recognized. A few
states inserted a qualifying phrase into the Virginia type of enactment and
declared only so much of the common law of England as was "applicable"
should be the rule of decision. However, the courts of those states which
provided no specific legislative authority to depart from common-law rules
unsuited to local conditions, have nevertheless felt free to reject common-
law principles considered "inapplicable." Thus the addition of the phrase
accepting the common law only so far as the same is "applicable" has had
little or no practical effect on the course of decisions dealing with the re-
ception problem.
A minority of states west of the Alleghenies have followed the practice
of Connecticut in tacitly accepting the common law as the rule of decision
and in leaving it completely to the courts to determine the extent of recep-
tion in situations not definitively covered by legislation. Here again the
courts of the states which did not pass explicit reception enactments have
in numerous instances rejected "inapplicable" common-law principles.
The third method of dealing with the reception problem, which has
been called for convenience the New Jersey method, retains so much of the
law as was practiced or existed before the jurisdiction became a state. A
counterpart for this method is to be found in states other than the original
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thirteen colonies in the somewhat similar situation where a newly-formed
territory or state specifically recognized as in force the common law as
practiced in an earlier jurisdiction. Although this type of reception provision
would seem to require the courts to determine what the practice actually
was in the earlier jurisdiction, the cases show that courts of these states have
generally used the same approach as the courts of states which adopted the
common law in a different way.
One of the primary points of concern of counsel and judges in arguing
and deciding if a common-law rule should be accepted or rejected as the
law of the particular jurisdiction, has been the question of whether or not
the court is invading the legislative field when it decides that the asserted
common-law principle is not applicable to the local situation.169 What, then,
is the proper province of the judiciary with respect to its application of com-
mon-law principles? and when should the rejection of an established rule
or the recognition of an interest which has never before been legally pro-
tected, be left to the legislature? We say the courts are "bound" by the
common law, yet the overwhelming majority of courts have followed a
culling process and by one means or another have discarded common-law
rules which they have deemed archaic. The cases are by no means unanimous
in their views as to when a court would be "legislating" and when it would
be keeping within the legitimate scope of the judicial process.
170
Most of the courts simply make the assertion that an established com-
mon-law principle can only be changed by the legislature, when it is felt
that the rule should be followed. On the other hand, the same courts, when
desiring to avoid the application of other common-law tenets, will say that
it is the duty of judges to keep the law abreast of the times. In neither
instance do courts ordinarily explain what it is that makes the contemplated
action legislative on the one hand, or judicial on the other. It might be said
that the courts should make only small or "creeping" changes, while the
legislature should gallop or go in reverse if it so desires.171 The writer
has previously suggested that what the courts are doing in this connection
169. This argument that a court is "legislating" when it asserts the power to deter-
mine "applicable" common-law rules, dates quite far back in our history. Thus, this
problem was an issue while the question of whether or not federal courts had an
inherent general common-law jurisdiction was being debated. See argument of Nicholson,
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 805-06 (1802). See generally, HowE, READiNGS IN AMaMcAN
LEGAL HisToRY 319-419 (1949).
170. Another way of stating the scope of the judicial function is: "Courts may
in proper instances apply old rules to newly created conditions, but they cannot
create new rules for conditions already regulated." Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288
N.W. 774, 775 (1939). The same statement is quoted in Stabs v. City of Tower, 229
Minn. 552, 40 N.W.2d 362, 371 (1949). But the quoted test is largely an illusory one,
for who can say as to any given case whether the court is applying an old rule to
new facts, or is creating a new principle or changing existing law?
171. See WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 63, § 30 (1884).
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is using the same technique as that adopted in constitutional law cases in-
volving substantive due process questions. 1 72  In the latter type of case the
postulate is that a legislative enactment or administrative determination will
be declared invalid when it "passes the bounds of reason and assumes the
character of a merely arbitrary fiat."'1 8 The analogy to the reception problem
cases is this: an asserted common-law principle will be followed even though
the judge himself from the'standpoint of wisdom or policy might personally
prefer another rule; but when the common-law rule contended for has become
so archaic as to make its application in modern times an arbitrary fiat, it
will be declared "inapplicable" to the local situation and rejected. This test
of course is in itself nothing more than an abstract postulate, and the ultimate
definition is one that must be left to the gradual process of judicial ex-
clusion and inclusion as is the case with so many other legal concepts.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the suggested test is a better way of de-
scribing what the courts are doing than is the "court-legislature" dichotomy.
In describing the transplanting of English law in the original American
colonies, and tracing its development westward and up to the present time in
the United States, we have seen a phase of what has been called the "frontier
process." One of the primary factors of this "frontier process" has been the
adoption of written constitutions by the United States and all of the
states. The earlier constitutions set the pattern for those further west, as
each one of them proceeded to drop various pieces of legal equipment that
had originated in England but which no longer served legitimate functions
in the newer civilization. This process has been described as follows:
"The junk of the past, the administrative junk that will accumulate in any com-
munity, was not particularly venerated, and in making the constitution it was relatively
easy to do away with it. In older settled, established communities we put up with
obsolete conditions, with laws that cease to fulfill a useful purpose, with institutions
that have become cumbersome instead of profitable. We keep on putting up with them,
because to change would be an annoyance and a nuisance, and because one can never
be quite sure in lopping off a governmental appendix that something else won't be lopped
off with it that will leave the system weaker instead of stronger for the operation. But
in these new communities, where they started with a great long table and a big white
sheet of paper and abundance of ink, with no solicitation as to what they should write
or should not, it was easy to cut out institutions of government and to substitute others
that they desired and approved. The 13 colonies did this, and then after independence
they allowed every new colony to do the same."174
172. See Hall, An Account of the Adoption of the Common Law by Texas, 28 TEx.
L. REv. 801, 825-826 (1950).
173. See Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204, 33 Sup. Ct. 44, 57
L. Ed. 184 (1912).
174. See Paxson, Influence of Frontier Life on the Development of American Law in
13 STATE BAR Assoc. OF Wis. REP. 477, 484 (1921).
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The judiciary has played its part in this "frontier process," but its
case-by-case role has been less spectacular than those played by constitution
makers "and legislators. No matter to what school of jurisprudence one
adheres, it must be admitted that the sum total of the judiciary's activities
in discarding archaic formalisms of the* common law has been great. We
have seen how from colonial times up to the present day, American jurists
have declared that English law bound us only so far as suited or adaptable
to our local circumstances. Although we are running out of frontiers
in the geographical sense, recent cases involving the reception problem
show that the judges in this country are still performing an eminent part
in making the law responsive to modem social needs.
